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Abstract. Use of intermediary hosts as stepping stones to conceal tracks
is common in Internet misuse. It is therefore desirable to find a method
to detect whether the originating party is using an intermediary host.
Such a detection technique would allow the activation of a number of
countermeasures that would neutralize the effects of misuse, and make it
easier to trace a perpetrator. This work explores a new approach in de-
termining if a host communicating via TCP is the data originator or if it
is acting as a mere TCP proxy. The approach is based on measuring the
inter packet arrival time at the receiving end of the connection only, and
correlating the observed results with the network latency between the
receiver and the proxy. The results presented here indicate that deter-
mining the use of a proxy host is possible, if the network latency between
the originator and proxy is larger than the network latency between the
proxy and the receiver. We show that this technique has potential to be
used to detect connections were data is sent through a TCP proxy, such
as remote login through TCP proxies, or rejecting spam sent through a
bot network.
Key words: TCP, Latency, Intermediary Host, Proxy Server, Botnet,
Intrusion Detection, Cyber Security
1 Introduction
The use of intermediary hosts as stepping stones to conceal tracks is common
in Internet misuse. By using intermediary hosts, the misuser will make it signif-
icantly more difficult to trace and detect his origins. When intermediaries are
used as stepping stones, the investigator has to identify the communicating host
was a stepping stone, and take steps to secure evidence on that host. This pro-
cess may be cumbersome, especially if the stepping stones are located in different
jurisdictions [7].
Further, there might be no evidence in the intermediary host that can be
used for further tracing, either because the investigation has taken too long, or
because the intermediary host has been specifically configured to avoid recording
anything about the originator. Previous research has identified stepping stones to
be particularly common during computer intrusions. In these instances, remote
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attackers have been found to log in by remote shell through several intermedi-
aries, effectively using them as TCP proxies [2].
Recent research has also revealed that spread of spam by the use of interme-
diary hosts is common. These intermediaries have been found to be computers
infected by malicious programs and are used as SOCKS proxies without the
owners’ knowledge or consent [13]. It is desirable to find a method to detect if
the communicating party is using an intermediary. This would allow activation
of a number of countermeasures that would neutralize the effects of the misuse,
and make it easier to trace the perpetrator. It would for example be possible for
a mail server to stop receiving email messages from such SMTP requests or login
server to deny entry for connections via an intermediary, or perhaps to activate
more verbose logging and notify a system administrator.
In this work, we propose a novel approach for detecting whether the host
initiating a TCP connection is an intermediary or not. The approach is based on
the observation that data in certain situations arrive in bursts, and the interval
between the bursts depends on the network latency of the different steps between
the receiver and the originator of the data. If the network latency between the
client and the proxy is larger than the observed latency between the proxy and
the server, it can be inferred that the traffic is passing through one or more
intermediaries.
Several researchers have studied the problem of detecting stepping stones in
the past. Staniford-Chen and Heberlein proposed using traffic content thumb
prints to find correlation between traffic on both sides of an intermediary [15].
This approach has been extended by several authors to also allow detection
for encrypted traffic by recognizing the timing information on the connec-
tion [11, 5, 12]. Others have studied the limitations of these approaches under
active countermeasures [18]. Coskun and Memon propose steppingstone detec-
tion based on the timing and correlation of ingress-egress packet flows at the
network border [4].
These approaches all require measurement points in the network distributed
in such a way that there is at least one measurement point on each side of
the intermediary. In this work, no measurement point in the network path is
assumed. Instead, we investigate the possibility to infer the existence of a TCP
proxy from observations at the receiving host end alone.
The experiments in this work have been conducted in a controlled lab envi-
ronment where the delay conditions in the lab shows similar behavior as for the
Internet environment. We focus here on investigating the feasibility and the po-
tential for this new technique of detecting intermediary hosts, which we answer
positively. The next step will be to consider the network congestion, effects of
application layer protocols, and other effects of observed network behavior.
2 Background
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the prevalent transmission protocol
on the Internet. TCP implements mechanisms to control the data rate to the
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network conditions, including bandwidth, latency of the connection and speed
of the receiving host. Network latency between two hosts on a network can be
defined as the amount of time elapsed from data has been sent from the sending
host until it has been received at the destination host. On the Internet, network
latency between two communicating hosts is the sum of the latencies in all the
routers and network links between the communicating hosts. Network latency
between two hosts on the Internet can be measured by sending icmp echo request
packets from one of the hosts to the other. Unless configured to do otherwise,
the other host will then reply with icmp echo reply packets, and the time elapsed
between sending echo request and receiving the reply is equal to the round trip
time (∆) of the connection.
∆ = 2 ∗ (δprop + δproc + δqueue) (1)
where δprop is the propagation delay, δproc is the delay caused by routers and
end hosts while processing the packets and δqueue is the delay caused by waiting
time in the router and end hosts’s queue.
The network latency can be approximated as half the value of round trip
time. This measurement can be done with the ping command. However, some
network service provider have special QoS class for echo packets to show the
better service. In the paper, we used the value of ∆ computed during the TCP
3-way handshake to avoid the special QoS class case for the ping packets.
The TCP control mechanisms include various algorithms designed to trans-
mit the data from the sender to the receiver as efficiently as possible, while
adjusting to the current conditions of the network and avoiding overloading the
network. One of these mechanisms is the TCP flow control [1] and another is the
Nagle [10] Algorithm. These algorithms are of special interest, since their appli-
cation result in a possibility to observe network latency in a TCP data flow. In
flow control mechanism, TCP window size limits the amount of unacked data in
to the network and results in a possibility to observe the network latency.
TCP uses the Nagle Algorithm to adjust the sending rate of traffic where
small amounts of data arrive at the TCP-layer frequently. The Nagle Algorithm
works by inhibiting the sender from sending new TCP segments if any previously
transmitted data on a connection remains unacknowledged [10]. New TCP data
can be sent immediately only in two cases: First, if the TCP connection is just
established or it was idle for some time. Second, if the size of the data to be sent
is larger than the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) and the available window size
of the receiver is also larger than MSS. If none of these conditions are satisfied,
TCP will wait until an ACK has been received for the previously transmitted
data until data is transmitted. As a result, data will be sent in bursts with
intervals in between. The length of the interval is equal to the time it takes for
the ack for the previously sent data to arrive. In other words, the burst interval
depends on the value of ∆ in the connection between the two hosts.
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3 Latency Propagation Theory
The underlying observation motivating this research is that the TCP flow control
causes network traffic to be sent in bursts where the interval between each burst
depends on the network latency. This property holds for example in the case of
a large file transfer, whereas in typical remote login protocols this property only
holds if the Nagle algorithm is in use.
The idea is that if these bursts are detectable when data traffic is sent via a
TCP-level proxy, then analysis of bursts and their intervals can be used at the
receiving end to determine if the observed sender is the original sender or a TCP
proxy.
SC
∆ cs
lcs
Fig. 1. A TCP connection between client C and server S on link lcs with ∆cs round
trip time
Consider a connection as shown in Fig 1 on a link lcs between a client C
and a server S having round trip time value equal to ∆cs. On the link lcs, the
TCP traffic can be either interactive type with small size segments or traffic due
to a large file transfer with large size segments. When the transmitted data is
interactive traffic, such as remote login and remote desktop session, then the
Nagle Algorithm is applied to the traffic. Exceeding the Maximum Segment Size
will enable the Nagle Algorithm.
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Fig. 2. Behavior of TCP burst interarrival time (τ) with (a) interactive and (b) file
transfer traffic type
With a TCP connection between client C and server S with round trip time
∆cs, an observer at the server S can now observe the traffic pattern of the
incoming data from the client C. The behavior observed by the observer will
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look similar to the pattern as shown in part (a) of Fig 2. Since the sender C will
have to wait for unacked data to be acked before it can send more data, there
will be an interval τ of value at least equal to ∆cs between the data bursts from
C as observed from S, as shown in Fig 2.
The time interval τ is called as Burst Interarrival Time(BIT), which is defined
as the time difference between the arrival time of the received burst and the arrival
time of the previous burst. The burst length in case of interactive traffic is equal
to single packet, due to the small data size.
Now assume the received traffic at server S is of type file transfer and thus the
segment size is large. Now the Nagle algorithm will not be involved in limiting
the client C, however the TCP flow control mechanism limits the client C by
CWND window size in sending large numbers of segments. In the initial phase
of the connection, the window size is equal to 2-3 segments. Subsequently, the
client C waits for an ack to arrive from server S. This will result in a time interval
τ which will be of value comparable to ∆cs. This pattern is shown in the pat
b) of Fig 2. The value of delay between packet P1 and P2 is very small as both
segments are sent together by client C. But after sending 2 segments client C
waits for an ack to arrive and therefore the next burst of packets will arrive after
interval τ of value comparable to ∆cs.
l cp
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Fig. 3. TCP connections between client C and proxy P, and proxy P and server S on
link lcp with ∆cp and link lps with ∆ps correspondingly
Now consider the connection setup of Fig 3, where P is acting as a TCP
proxy. In this case, an observer at server S may not know that P is acting as
a proxy, and may erroneously believe that the host P is the originator of the
communication.
Data received at P from C is immediately forwarded to S by the proxy
program running at P. Thus, when segments arrive at P, the data will already be
in bursts, with burst interval depending on ∆cp. The resulting interval between
data bursts perceived by the observer at S will then depend on both ∆cp and
∆ps.
We hypothesize that the burst interval observed at the server S will depend on
the largest of ∆cp or ∆ps. If ∆cp is larger than ∆ps, the burst interval as observed
at S will depend on ∆cp and not on ∆ps. If this is the case, an observer at S can
use the burst interval to determine if P is the real originator of the connection,
by measuring the ∆ps and comparing with the observed burst intervals τ . See
Fig. 4
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Client Server
SY N−−−−−−−−−−→
SY N+ACK←−−−−−−−−−−
ACK−−−−−−−−−−→
}
∆
DATA−−−−−−−−−−→
ACK←−−−−−−−−−−
DATA−−−−−−−−−−→
}
τ
...
Fig. 4. The TCP threeway handshake and data segments measurements of the round
trip time ∆, and the burst interarrival time τ .
4 Statistical Model of Burst Inter-arrival Time
The purpose of our statistical model is to distinguish between the lcs connection
and the lps connection. We construct a model of the lcs connection to achieve
this purpose. As explained in Section 3, we expect ∆cs and τ to have similar
values. Thus, we assume that there is a linear relationship between ∆ and τ . We
model the round trip time as ∆+ ∆ and the burst inter-arrival time as τ + τ ,
where ∆ and τ represent the random errors in δprop, δproc and δqueue.
We have to make several assumptions to be able to construct a hypothesis
test. We assume that ∆ and τ are independent and identically distributed.
This assumption implies that the network is not congested, and that none of
the nodes have strained computational or memory resources. Furthermore, we
assume that ∆ and τ follow a normal distribution. The normality assumption
is investigated empirically in Section 5.
We use simple linear regression with ∆ as the independent variable and
τ as the dependent variable to model the linear relationship between ∆ and
τ . The slope b and intersection a can be estimated based on an experiment
with n samples, where each of the samples is a tuple (∆i, τi). The simple linear
regression model is based on the assumption that the independent variable is
exact, which is not the case in our experiments. However, the model still provides
an unbiased estimate of the slope b and intersection a of the linear relationship.
We also used an orthogonal regression model to verify that the results of the
simple linear regression were unbiased. The orthogonal regression model resulted
in the same parameters a and b.
We use the linear regression model to construct a prediction interval for
the τ values to be observed. (Walpole et al. [17, p.410] or other basic statistics
textbook will explain how to construct a prediction interval for a simple linear
regression model.) Under the assumptions presented above, a 100(1− α)% one-
Intermediary Hosts Detection 7
sided prediction interval is:
{(∆0, τ0)|τ0 < a+ b∆0 + tαs
√
1 +
1
n
+
(∆0 −∆)2∑n
i=1 (∆i −∆)2
} (2)
where
s =
√∑n
i=1 (τi − τ)2 − b
∑n
i=1 (∆i −∆)(τi − τ)
n− 2
tα is a value of the Student-T distribution with n − 2 degrees of freedom. ∆
represents the mean of the ∆i values, and τ represents the mean of the τi values
from the linear regression.
The following hypotheses are defined to use the model for hypothesis testing:
H0 : ∆0 = τ0
H1 : ∆0 < τ0
H0 represents the lcs connection and H1 represents the lps connection. A tuple
(∆0, τ0) can then be measured for a single connection. If the measured τ0 value
falls outside the prediction interval, H0 is rejected and we assume that a proxy
is being used.
5 Experimental Setup
Three experiments are performed to test the proposed hypothesis. The first
experiment is a RTT experiment, which tests the latency behavior of the lab
setup against the real world Internet latency behavior. This will show how much
the setup resembles with real world and applicability of the results. The second
experiment is conducted using the connection setup as shown in Fig 1. The
purpose of this experiment is to see the variation in τ values under different ∆
values. We made our model based on setup shown in Fig 1. The last experiment
is conducted to test validity of the model to detect intermediary host under the
presence of a proxy host in the connection. The setup for third experiment is
shown in Fig 3. The result from all these experimets are described in section 6.
The experiments are done under controlled laboratory conditions to eliminate
unknown factors and to ensure repeatability. Three computers are configured
with Linux distribution Ubuntu 9.10 running kernel 2.6.31-5. These are attached
to the same 100 Mb Ethernet LAN and given roles as server (S), client (C) and
proxy (P). The round trip time between any of the three computers on the LAN
is approximately 1 ms.
In the experimental setup data is generated at the client side and sent to
the server with varying latency on the connection in between as shown in Fig 2.
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The arriving data bursts can then be observed at the receiving server S and the
results can be checked for consistency with the hypothesis. If the results from
this experiment do not refute the hypothesis, the experiment can proceed with
introducing a proxy P between the client and the server as shown in Fig 3.
To generate the traffic, a different traffic generating program named Traffic
Generator (TG), tool developed at SRI International and University of Southern
California [9] is used. In the experiments, TG is used to generate TCP traffic
on the client C and to sink the traffic at the server S. The experiments are
conducted with different packet length and time distributions as described in
the next section.
GNU Netcat was used as proxy [6]. Netcat is a simple utility, which reads
and writes data across the network connections using TCP and UDP transport
protocols. In the experiments, netcat was setup as a proxy in the following way:
$ mknod backpipe p
$ nc -l -v -p 1234 0<backpipe | nc 129.241.209.XXX
1234 1>backpipe
When the client connects to this port and sends data to it, a new TCP connection
is opened to the server (129.241.209.XXX) at port 1234 and received data is
forwarded to it. Any data received in the opposite direction is forwarded back
to the client through the pipe.
To observe the results on the server S, the packet sniffer Deamonlogger [14]
was used. It was necessary to increase the amount of memory used for the cap-
turing engine to avoid packets being dropped. Further, the Wireshark packet
analyzer [3] was used to analyze the captured packets.
To create network latencies resembling Internet latencies in the laboratory,
Netem coupled with the Traffic Control (tc) tool was used. Netem and the traffic
control tool are parts of the iproute2 package of the Linux kernel. The traffic
control tool uses Netem to emulate Internet behavior. The queuing architecture
of Linux kernel is shown in Figure 5. The queuing discipline sits between the
protocol output and the network device. The queuing discipline is an object
with two interfaces. One interface receives packet from IP protocol and another
interface forwards these packets to the network device. The queuing discipline
makes the decision of forwarding packet based upon the defined policies.
6 Burst Interarrival Time Results
6.1 RTT Experiment Results
To make sure that the lab setup resembles with the real world behavior, the
behavior of induced delay via netem is tested against the real world round trip
delay results. An experiment has been performed to ping the Univ. of Tromsø web
server from the lab system. Thus results obtained from pinging the web server
are compared with the result from pinging the lab server from the same system
with similar ∆ values.
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Fig. 5. Linux Queuing Architecture
Four experiments are performed to compare our lab setup to a real world
scenario and to investigate how close the ∆ values follow a normal distribution.
Two experiments are performed on the lab setup, and two experiments are per-
formed on the Internet connection. The Internet connection from the lab to the
University of Tromsø has no preferential treatment of ICMP packets. 100,000
ICMP echo requests are issued in each experiment, and the ∆ value recorded
with microsecond accuracy.
Scenario # Samples Median Mean Stdev
Lab 1 100,000 14719µs 14768µs 111µs
Lab 2 99,998 14714µs 14766µs 173µs
UiT 1 99,995 14869µs 14872µs 61µs
UiT 2 100,000 14869µs 14872µs 69µs
Table 1. Results from the RTT validation experiment
Table 1 shows the estimated parameters of the sampling distributions for
each experiment under the normality assumption. The estimated parameters
show that the measurements from the real world scenario have less variance and
a median closer to the mean than the measurements from our lab setup. This
indicates that the results from our lab could be applicable to the real world
scenario we use as a comparison.
Figure 6 shows the normal quantile-quantile plots for each of the experiments.
The normal Q-Q plots show that an overwhelming majority of the measured
∆ values follow a normal distribution. However, the distributions have a long
right tail. This result is expected, as any deviation from the distribution due to
excessive processing or queueing delays will result in a higher ∆. The lower part
of the distribution is bounded by the propagation delay.
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Fig. 6. Normal Q-Q plots for the RTT validation experiment. Most of the measure-
ments follow the normal distribution, but there is a long tail to the right in each of the
plots.
We use the estimated parameters from the first sample in each scenario to
compute 100(1−α)% two-sided prediction intervals for the distributions, under
the normality assumption. Table 2 shows the results. We use the Student-T dis-
tribution to compute the prediction intervals. We then use the second sample
in each scenario to test the estimated prediction interval. Lost packets are con-
sidered to have a ∆ value higher than the prediction interval. The goals of this
test are to determine how closely the prediction interval of a normal distribution
matches the measured ∆ values, to quantify the impact of the long right tail,
and to compare the results from our lab setup to the real world scenario.
The effect of the long right tail can clearly be seen for α/2 ≤ 0.001. For
these α values, none of the measured ∆ values are lower than the prediction
interval, but approximately 200 of the ∆ values exceed the prediction interval.
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α/2 E(∆) ∆Lab < ∆Lab > ∆UiT < ∆UiT >
0.1 10,000 4,216 615 51 885
0.05 5,000 4,181 443 51 606
0.01 1,000 0 237 49 299
0.005 500 0 237 49 202
0.001 100 0 236 0 199
0.0005 50 0 236 0 199
0.0001 10 0 222 0 199
Table 2. Number of values lower and higher than the 100(1−α)% prediction intervals
These are the values on the long right tail. The right tail thus puts a lower bound
on the α value, where decreasing it further has little effect. The optimal value
is α = 0.001, where we only have to consider the one-sided prediction interval
larger than the estimated mean. α represents the probability of a type I error
(false positive). The lowest practical α value we are able to achieve, given the
distribution of ∆, is between 0.002 and 0.003. For the rest of this paper, we will
use the conservative assumption that α = 0.001 gives a 0.5% probability of type
I errors.
Finally, Table 2 also shows that for α ≤ 0.001, the results from our lab setup
and the real world scenario are very similar. In both cases, a prediction interval
computed under a normality assumption gives less than a 0.5% probability of
type I errors for α = 0.001. The results in Section 6 are thus applicable to the
real world scenario as well.
6.2 Burst Interarrival Time Results from No Proxy Case
To study the TCP behavior on a connection lcs, the data traffic is generated
by TG on the connection using an exponentially distributed packet size with a
mean of size equal to MSS bytes. The experiment is performed to transfer 10
Kbytes of data from a client (sender) to a server (receiver). The τ values were
measured at the server side from the incoming bursts.
The delay (∆) values chosen for experiments are varies from 1ms - 50ms
with an increment of 1ms. Initially, the tests are conducted using these values
to study the IPT behavior without introducing a proxy system in the network
path. The values of delays are chosen so to observe the effect of variation of ∆
values on the observed pattern at the server side. The connection setup in this
case is similar to shown in the Fig 1.
We measure 20 tuples (∆i, τi) for each of the increments, for a total of
n = 1000 samples. We then use the samples to perform a simple linear re-
gression. Figure 7 shows the measurements and the estimated regression line.
The estimated intercept is a = 144µs and the estimated slope is b = 0.999,
which are very close to the expected values a = 0µs and b = 1 for a perfect
linear relationship. The R2 value for the regression is 0.9998.
Figure 8 shows a normal Q-Q plot of the residuals. Most of the residuals follow
a normal distribution, but as in the previous experiment, the distribution has a
12 Gurvinder Singh, Martin Eian, Svein Y. Willassen, and Stig Fr. Mjølsnes
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
Measured Values, Regression Line and Prediction Interval
∆ (µs)
τ
 
( µ
s
)
 
 
Prediction Interval
Regression Line
Measured Value
Fig. 7. The measured values, regression line and prediction interval with α = 0.001.
The number of samples outside the prediction interval is 12 (1.2% of the samples).
long tail. However, the long tail starts earlier in the residuals than in the RTT
experiment. Thus, the expected number of observations outside the prediction
interval will be higher than in the RTT experiment. We use Formula 2 to compute
a 99.9% one-sided prediction interval (α = 0.001), which is shown in Figure 7
together with the regression line and measurements. 12 of the samples (1.2%)
in the linear regression model are outside the prediction interval, so we cannot
make the same conclusion as in the RTT experiment. Based on the results, a
conservative assumption is that 95% of τ values to be observed fall within the
99.9% prediction interval. Thus, when we use α = 0.001, the actual false positive
rate is 5%, rather than 0.1%. The residual standard error is 179µs, which is
similar to the results from the previous experiments.
From the result, we have seen that the bursts arrived at the server side after
corresponding delay ∆cs of the lcs connection. The similar behavior is seen in all
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Fig. 8. Normal Q-Q plot of the residuals. The right tail is significantly longer for the
residuals of the linear regression than for the RTT experiments.
the test cases. The observed behavior can be explained by the TCP flow control
algorithm, which limits the amount of data to the sender by window size. The
client must then wait for ACK to arrive before sending more data.
The client sends the data bursts to the server and upon receiving the data,
the server acknowledges it and this acknowledgement arrives at the client side
after completing journey from server to the client. This result in arrival of ACK
at the client side after one complete RTT delay of the connection and the next
data packet at the server end arrives after this delay. The observed data is
thus consistent with the hypothesis that burst interarrival time is related to the
network delay.
6.3 Burst Interarrival Time Results from Proxy Case
Now to study the TCP behavior under the presence of the proxy system, we
introduce a proxy system between the server and the client. The connection
setup of this test case is shown in Fig 3. The delay between server and the
proxy system is set to 20ms and delay between the proxy and the client system
is varying from 10 ms, 20 ms, 25ms, 30ms and 50ms respectively. The reason
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behind choosing the specific delay conditions is as, the given settings address the
case when the delay on client-proxy connection is less, equal and higher than
server-proxy connection. Therefore we will see the IPT behavior in all five cases.
We measure 100 samples (∆i, τi) for each of the cases ∆cp ∈ {10ms, 20ms,
25ms, 30ms, 50ms}. Figure 9 shows the results. The approximate prediction in-
terval shown in the figure is based on the maximum ∆ value measured to be
able to illustrate the results in a single figure. We then use the linear regression
model to perform the hypothesis test from Section 4 on each sample. For the
cases ∆cp ≤ 20ms, we do not detect the proxy in any of the samples. However,
for the cases ∆cp ≥ 25ms, we detect the proxy in all of the samples.
0 20 40 60 80 100
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1 0
0 0
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2 0
0 0
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3 0
0 0
0
4 0
0 0
0
5 0
0 0
0
Measured Values and Approximate Prediction Interval, ∆ps = 20ms
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τ  
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∆cp = 10ms
∆cp = 20ms
∆cp = 25ms
∆cp = 30ms
∆cp = 50ms
Prediction Interval
Fig. 9. An illustration of the results for the proxy case. The approximate regression
line was based on the maximum ∆ value measured. For the experiments where ∆cp ≤
20ms, we are not able to detect the proxy at all. However, for the experiments where
∆cp ≥ 25ms, we achieve a 100% detection rate.
When ∆cp is either 10ms or 20ms, the measured τ is approximately 20ms
at the server side, which is the value of ∆ps. In the other test cases, when ∆cp
is higher than 20ms, the measured τ at the server side is significantly higher
than 20 ms. This is caused by the TCP flow control algorithm, which limits the
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amount of data to the sender by the window size of the connection. The client
must then wait for an ACK to arrive before sending more data. Thus, in this
case, the observed τ values at the server is different from what would be expected
with the ∆ps between the proxy and the server.
We observe that if ∆ps is higher than ∆cp then it is possible to infer the
presence of a proxy system from the observed τ values of the incoming bursts.
The proxy system will receive data from the client within the ∆cp delay of its
connection with the client. As a result, the data arrive at the server side with τ
values comparable to ∆cp, which are higher than ∆ps and make the detection of
proxy system possible. The higher the value of ∆cp is compared to ∆ps higher
the accuracy is in detection of proxy system.
From the above results, we see that the TCP flow control algorithm behaves
differently under different delay conditions. Similar behavior has been shown
when the traffic with small segment size was generated and the τ values from
the initial stage were compared with the ∆ value of the underlying connection.
This behavior was, as hypothesized, due to the Nagle algorithm, which inhibits
sender from sending small size of data, until the arrival of ack of unacked data.
Thus, by monitoring the τ values of incoming bursts at the receiver end, it is
possible to detect the presence of intermediary hosts by comparing the τ values
against the incoming connection ∆ value. If the τ value is comparable to the ∆
delay of the incoming connection, then connection is most likely to be the direct
connection, otherwise the connection can be marked as an incoming connection
through intermediary hosts.
7 Discussion and Future Work
The result from RTT experiment has shown that the lab setup conditions are
similar to the Internet round trip time behavior. Thus the result obtained from
the experiments performed in lab under varying ∆ values are applicable to in-
ternet with high accuracy and detection rate. The result from experiments per-
formed on different network conditions has shown that it is possible for the
receiver of a TCP connection, under certain circumstances, to infer if the other
end of the TCP connection is the originator or if it is acting as a TCP proxy.
This can be inferred by measuring (τ) values of the incoming bursts and correlate
with the measured round trip time (∆) for the connection.
The accuracy in detecting intermediary hosts depends upon the how accurate
are the values of ∆ and τ . if the ∆ value is high compared to real value, due to
network congestion or due to the outlier value of ∆ as seen in the long tail nature
of its distribution, then there will be a probability of false negatives. However
if the τ value is high again either due to congestion or outlier value, then there
is a significant probability to have the false positives. The lower bound for both
∆ and τ values is bounded by the δprop, so the probability of having false posi-
tives or false negatives due to low values is very low. If the detection mechanism
detects the incoming connection as proxy connection, then server can reset the
connection. With given 5% false positive rate, the probablity of detecting the
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same connection will decrease by (5%)n due to independence between the in-
coming connection. Thus probability of detecting the legitimate connection as
a proxy connection decreases exponentially. Moreover higher the value of ∆cp is
compared to ∆ps higher the accuracy is in detection of intermediary host.
During the research work, we have observed that the proxy type used in the
communication session results in different behavior at the receiver end. In the
above experiments, we have used Netcat as a proxy, which sends the ack to the
client C of received data and then forwards the data to the sever S. However
during our research work, we have found some programs, which works as a TCP
level proxy such as iprelay [16], which does not send the ack to the client C until
they have received from the server S. This behavior will result in higher τ value,
which is equal to sum of the ∆ values on both the connections.
The experiments in this work have been conducted in a controlled lab envi-
ronment and the delay conditions in the lab has shown similar behavior as of real
Internet environment. However, considering the congestion in the network and
effect of application layer protocols on the observed behavior for intermediary
hosts detection is an area of further study.
The generalized question of a sequence of intermediary host connections can
be further investigated.
8 Conclusion
This work has explored the possibility of determining whether a host commu-
nicating via a TCP connection is the data originator or just acting as a TCP
proxy, by measuring the inter packet arrival at the receiving end of the connec-
tion. Our results indicate that this is possible, if the network latency between
the originator and proxy is larger than the network latency between the proxy
and the receiver. This novel method has applications in various domains such
as reject malicious remote logins through TCP proxies, or reject spam messages
send through a proxy bot network, or block the access to restricted media con-
tents when request arrives from a proxy host or detection of the Tor [8] usage
in an incoming connection.
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